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This article presents a conceptual framework that 
identifies four kinds of CEO succession processes. 
These are Crown Heir, Horse Race, Coup d'Etat, 
or Comprehensive Search. Examples ofeach type 
(Apple Computer, General Motors, Kodak and 
P&G) are presented to help understand each type 
of succession process. 
Effective succession planning is a dynamiC and creative process. CEO succession can fail because of inadequate differentiation among the processes by 
which CEOs are appointed. Crown Heir, Horse Race, Coup 
d'Etat, and Comprehensive Search are the four idealized 
types of CEO succession processes. They are illustrated here 
in the succession events that occurred at Apple Computer, 
General Motors, Kodak and P&G. 
The purpose of presenting the four idealized types is to 
show differences in how successions occur. Table 1 
summarizes each type. The answers to two main questions 
determine the type: Who rules? Are preferences known in 
advance? More specifically, the key attributes used to 
describe each type are whether the incumbent CEO 
dominates in decision-making, the length of time over which 
the process occurs, whether candidates know of their status 
as candidates, the number of sources tapped for information 
about candidates, the amount of time spent in decision­
making, and whether there is more than one candidate. 
Crown Heir: Scully to Spindler at Apple 
Computer 
In the Crown Heir succession process, the incumbent rules, 
and preferences are known in advance. The primary 
decision-maker is the predecessor CEO, the span of time 
over which the process unfolds is great, and the heir apparent 
is identified and informed as to his or her status early on 
(there is information symmetry). He or she may, however, 
have to wait until the predecessor leaves office in order to 
assume control. In some cases, this prOvides an opportunity 
to train and prepare the successor and his or her 
management team. Alternatively, the wait may be 
frustrating and may lead to attempts by an appointed 
successor either to force the incumbent out prematurely or 
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Who rules? 
Incumbent 
. Non-incumbent 
Table I:. Four ways to choose a CEO 
_____A_'re_.. preferenc.!~!no~ in a~ce1~.__...__ 
Yes 
Crown Heir 
CEO dominated 
Lo~g time span 
Information symmetry 
Few inInrmation sources 
. Limited time sr1ent 
Singlecandidate 
Coup d'Etat 
Nc.m<ceO dominated 
Short time span 
information asymmetry 
Few information sources 
Umitedtimespent 
Singlecarldidate 
No 
Horse Race 
CEO dominated 
Long time span 
Information symmatry 
Many information sources 
Much time spent 
Multip~cand#iates 
CtlPlpJl!hensive Seareb 
NannO ammnated 
snort time span 
Infnrmatinn asymmetry 
Many infurma tion sources 
Much time spent 
MuUiplecandidates 
to seek employment elsewhere. In the Crown Heir type of succession, information sources tapped 
by the incumbentare few, and the amount of time and energy spent in deliberations about criteria 
and candidates is limited. 
The selection of Michael Spindler to replace John Scully as CEO of Apple Computer in June of 
1993 is an example of Crown Heir type. The decision was strongly influenced by the predecessor 
(Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1993). The process took several years from the time the heir was 
apparently known until the fonnal selection was made, and it did not require extensive orexpensive 
candidate searches. Both the predecessor and successor CEOs were aware of key aspects of the 
process as it unfolded.. 
Michael Spindler was with Apple 13 years before becoming CEO. He ran Apple Europe before 
being named chief operating officer and then president in 1990. At that time, Spindler replaced 
Albert Eisenstat as Scully'S right-hand man. It was then speculated that Spindler was the heir 
apparent (Wall Street Journal, November 12,1990); Scully stated in 1993 that about two years prior 
he had identified Spindler to the Board as the person most likely to succeed him 
(New York Times, June 19,1993). 
The working relationship between Spindler and Scully helped groom Spindler for the job. 
After ten years as CEO, Scully began focusing more and more on the big issues while he let 
Spindler take care of the day-to-day running of Apple. The pair was characterized as Mr. Outside 
and Mr. Inside (Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1993). The question became not who should be the next 
CEO, but rather when should Scully step down and let Spindler take complete control. This 
happened in the summer of 1993, a time when Apple needed to make some changes, including 
cuts in work force. Scully asserts that he had been conSidering stepping back from operations for 
some time and wanted to make a graceful exit Board members were quoted as saying at the time 
that II the board had discussed the issue of succession in general terms in the last several years, but 
the decision to make the change was Scully's" (New York Times, June 19, 1993). 
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After the announcement, there was some disagreement as to whose plan Spindler would now 
follow. Some said that as CEO he would do what he had been doing and wanted to do all along 
(New York Times, June 19, 1993). Others (mostly outsiders), however, speculated that Spindler 
would implement a plan largely defined by Scully (Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1993). In either case, the 
succession process resulted in the appearance of a relatively smooth passing of the baton. 
This example of the Crown Heir type shows how in some successions the replacement is 
identified long before taking office. Spindler was Scully's choice, and there was apparently no 
subsequently effort to search for other candidates. Instead, efforts were made to ease the transition 
to the new leader by gradually shifting greater and greater responsibility. 
Horse Race: Smale to Artzt at P&G 
A Horse Race pits several key insiders against each 
other as candidates who are told that they will be A Horse Race begins with an 
groomed, their progress will be observed, and that incumbent showingwhoever performs best over a period of time will be 
chosen as the new CEO. It is characterized by preferences for candidates to 
incumbent rule and preferences about criteria that 
run for the top officeare unclear or unstable at the outset. 
A Horse Race begins with an incumbent shOWing 
preferences for candidates to run for the top office. 
As candidates are observed and compared, priorities 
about selection criteria upon which to judge them emerge and often shift during the race. Multiple 
sources are tapped for information about candidates and how they score on selection criteria. 
Candidates may try to influence decision~makers through lobbying efforts and the cultivation of 
personal relationships during the evaluation period. Like the Crown Heir process, Horse Races 
take a long time. Only inside candidates are considered, and their status as candidates is often 
knO\'vn to them. In this type of process the best candidate among those in the race succeeds. 
A variation of the Horse Race occurs when a race is run but no om~ wins. That is, at the end of 
the race none of the candidates is deemt!d good t.'nough for the job, so the process b(>gins again, or 
an outsider is chosen in place of anyone of the contenders. Another variation, the ff fixed race," is 
equivalent to a Crown Heir succession process in that only one candidate is ever seriously considered. 
Pseud~candidacies may be promoted as means of creating the appearance of a democratic process. 
Procter and Gamble's (P&G) decision to name Ed Artzt as CEO in the fall of 1989 came as a 
surprise to many observers. Retiring CEO John Smale named Artzt over the presumed frontrunner, 
John Pepper, because of the strong performance of the international division Artzt headed. We 
consider this a Horse Race because the incumbent CEO dominated the process; it took place over 
a long period of time; there was. more than one potential candidate; and extensive information 
was collected about candidates and criteria. 
When the race began, Artztwas not expected to be the next CEO. It was speculated instead that 
Pepper would replace Smale when the latter retired in the early 1990s (Wall Street Joumal, Apri113, 
1984). It had been the norm at P&G to select a CEO from the next generation of managers. In the 
1980s, one of the leaders of the upcoming generation was}ohnPepper.ln 1984, at the age of 45 he 
was named executive vic~president in charge of most ofP&G's domestic consumer goods. Pepper 
~as 11 years younger than Smale. At the same time, two other executives also received promotions: . 
Ed Artzt took over responsibility for international operations, and Thomas Laco oversaw staff 
functions. Because both of them were in their early 50s, the prevailing view was that neither 
would become CEO; they wouldjust continue at P&G until the next generation replaced them. 
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Over the next several years, the company's international operations expanded dramatically. 
By the late 1980s, the international division accounted for more than a third of total sales and was 
growing faster than domestic operations, achieving double-digit unit volume growth in many 
countries. International sales were projected to be 60% of total sales by the mid-1990s .. 
Even though Pepper was named president in 1986 and was still considered by outside analysts 
to be the likely successor, within the company Artzt and Pepper were considered equals. In 
October of 1989, Smale decided to retire three years earlier than expected in order to spend time 
with his family. Then he announced that Artzt would replace him. Up to this time there had been 
no public knowledge of the change. 
Artzt's successful international experience was the reason stated for his selection (t'\fall Street 
loumal, October 11, 1989). This experience gave him the edge over Pepper, who then replaced 
Artzt as head of international operations. The result was an orderly succession, withsome speculation 
that the timing of Smale' 5 retirement had to do with his desire to give Artzt a long enough tenure 
to have an impact of his own before retiring and being succeeded by Pepper (New York Times, 
October 11, 1989). . 
The succession of Artzt in this Horse Race shows the process can be a long one in which viable 
candidates are evaluated over an extended period of time, and a decision is made after much data 
about criteria and candidates have been collected and considered. The result was a 
CEO-dominated choice and a smooth transition. 
Coup d'Etat: Stempel to Smith at General 
Motors Co~ps d'Etat are 
Coups d'Etat are characterized by non-incumbent characterized-by
rule and preferences being known in advance. 
Organization members and others (e.g., board of non-Incumbent rule and 
directors) who constitute a coalition of interests that 
preferences being differs from the incumbent's make the key decisions 
in this type of succession. The span of time over which known 1n advance 
the process unfolds is relatively short Though the 
seeds of revolution may be sown well in advance, it 
is not until conditions change enough to empower a ---------------­
non-incumbent coalition that an overthrow can succeed. Information is not widely shared in this 
case. Knowledge of the iQSurgency is kept from the incumbent, because, if the plan becomes 
public it may be destroyed, or a viable counter-attack may be launched by the incumbent. 
A coup begins with a minority faction asserting that the current leader is no longer adequate. 
Members of this insurgent coalition typically include a subset of top management in concert with 
the board of directors, or some subset of the board. This faction defines selection criteria that 
indicate a need for change in the qualities possessed by the CEO and nominates a single candidate, 
often the leader of the coup, who is then anointed as successor. There is relatively little time spent 
on debate over selection criteria and candidate nomination.1 . 
The succession of Jack Smith as CEO of General Motors (GM) in October of 1992 came as a 
result of a Coup d'Etat in which the board of directors forced the resignation of Robert Stempel 
and then named Smith as the new CEO. In addition, the board appointed an outside director, 
A takeout'r is Q vllriatiim of the Coup d'Etat process. An outsider comes into parDer by acqlliril'g majority 
owllership tmd deposes c"rrent administTatioJl. At the time tire t!Vt.mt is il/itiated decisioll-makers aTe 
I/OII-lIulIlagemmt OWI/ers, IISlUllly bankers or large slUlrelroldcTS. 
Global CEO • Match 2004 
1 
I 
• 
SPECIAl ISSUE CEO SUCCESSION PLANNING ... 
retired P&G CEO, John Smale, as Chairman,de-<oupling the positions of CEO and Chairman. This 
process occurred over a relatively short period of time and was characterized by an outsider's 
ascent to power. Information about the process was not widespread throughout the company, 
and only one candidate was apparently considered in choosing a successor. 
First public signs of the uprising appeared in April of 1992, when outside board members, in 
what was described as a stunning shakE'-up (Neu.l York Times, April 7, 1992), took control of a key 
board committee and replaced GM's president. Unhappy with the company's financial crisis 
stemming from poor sales in the North American market, outside directors removed Stempel as 
head of the board's executive committee. This committee oversees company's actions between 
monthly board meetings. Smale took over control of the committee. Additionally, the Board 
demoted the president of GM, Lloyd Reuss, and replaced him with Jack Smith, who was the chief 
of GM's operations. Reuss, a close friend of Stempel's, was viewed by the board as failing to stern 
the tide of red ink. This shake-up was thought to be enough to break-up the "clubby" atmosphere 
at the top level of GM (Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1992). 
This situation did not improve dramatically enough over the next several months. Speculation 
abounded, inside and outside of the company, about Stempel' s tenure. In October, after months of 
uncertainty, the board reportedly asked for Stempel's resignation. Just days before, Stempel had 
again denied the persistent rumors, but according to reports, the board through an intermediary 
requested him to leave (Wall Street ]oumal, October 27, 1993). On October 26th he resigned. 
The board accepted his resignation but requested that he remain in office until a successor was 
named. At the time, it was predicted that Smith would become CEO, and Smale would become 
Chairman (New York Times, October 27, 1993). Indeed at a board meeting the following week, Jack 
Smith was promoted to CEO, andJohn Smale was named Chairman. In what was a slight surprise 
to some analysts, Smith was now viewed as the person who could run GM, and Smale would take 
a lesser role (Los Angeles Times, November 3, 1993). 
This example illustrates how a Coup d'Etat is a quick and turbulent succession. The CEO was 
forced to resign, remaining in an interim role only until a successor was formally named the 
following week. Although it took a week to name the successor, there was only one candidate 
seriously considered. Rumors were rampant because information about the intent of the board 
resided in a few individuals who did not openly share it, particularly with the outgoing CEO. 
Comprehensive Search: Whitmore to Fisher at Kodak 
In the Comprehensive Search process non-incumbents exert control, and preferences are not 
known in advance. Decision-makers seek a CEO whose background and skills match those required 
by an intended organizational reorientation. The process is comprehensive: Extensive effort is 
expended in data collection; many decision-makers are involved; and the procedure incorporates 
input and approval by individuals who are knowledgeable of both potential candidates and the 
future demands of the rol~. . 
In a Comprehensive Search, role requirements are derived from a systematic consideration of 
future demands on an organization, and candidates are selected on the basis of their ability to 
fulfill those requirements. Criteria may shift, however, to fit the available candidate pool during 
the course of the search among alternative candidates, because the perfect candidate (one who 
precisely matches preordained selection criteria and is available) rarely exists. Although the 
incumbent CEO may have some input to the decision, his or her preferences are outweighed by 
others, usually the board of directors. Coalitions compete for control in defining selection criteria 
and in evaluating candidates. Prospects mayor may not be aware of their status as candidates, 
especially those who are not organization members but are employed elsewhere. Although the 
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search is intensive and extensive, it occurs over a relatively short span of time because it is motivated 
by a pressing need for change in organization strategy and direction. 
Kodak's selection of George Fisher as CEO ended an extensive search for a successor to Kay 
Whitmore. This example of a Comprehensive Search shows how a board can dominate the selection 
process in trying to find a CEO who will lead the company in a new direction. In so doing, the 
company considered a large pool of candidates and devoted significant resources to the decision 
process. 
It began when Whitmore, after being CEO for three years, was fired by the board of directors 
because of his ineffectiveness. v\7hitmore had risen to the position after many years at Kodak and 
was a product of its strong company culture. During his tenure he repeatedly feuded with the 
board over the company's direction. The board, dominated by outsiders, thought the company 
was under performing and wanted a stronger, clearer vision fOJ: the future. The board also objected 
to the too-few changes Whitmore had proposed to cut costs. They asserted that they might have 
fired him earlier but wanted to give him a chance to tum the company around. 
After several years of frustration, the board decided to replace Whitmore at a meeting on July 
23, 1993. Nine outside directors asked the CEO and three insider board members to leave the 
room. These outsiders then voted unanimously to replace Whitmore. He was told that he could 
remain in office until a successor could be named. This arrangement was not made public until 
early August (Wall Street Journal, August 9,1993). 
Until the firing, the heir apparent was an insider, Leo "Jack" Thomas (Wall Street Tourntll, 
September 9, 1993), but the board decided that the company needed an outsider in order to affect 
a strategic reorientation. The search for a new CEO was overseen by one of the outside directors, 
Roberto Goizueta, Chairman of Coca-Cola. Gerard Roche, Chairman of the executive recruiting 
company Heidrick & Struggles, headed the search. The stated qualifications for the new CEO 
were: 
• Had to be an outsider, someone who would bring new ideas to the company, 
• Had to have a strong marketing background (Wall Street Tournal, August 9, 1993). 
Additionally, it was stated that the ideal candidate would be able to serve for ten years, be energetic, 
and be diplomatic (in order to make the needed changes). The board knew this would not be an 
easy transition, as it was expected that additional turnover in the upper echelon would occur when 
the new CEO brought in new managers to help redirect the company. 
A short list appeared in September (Wall Street Tourntll, September 9, 1993), a~d it was stated 
that at that time there was no clear favorite. In addition to Fisher, then Motorola's CEO, the list 
included: 
• John Scully, Apple Computer's Chairman of the Board 
• Stanley Gault, Chairman and CEO of Goodyear Tire and Rubber. 
• Victor Pelson, an AT&T executive 
• JPhillip Samper, former Kodak Vice-Chairman 
• Richard Braddock, Kodak board member and former Citicorp CEO 
• John Phelan, Kodak board member 
• Charles Knight, Chairman of Emerson Electric 
The recruitment process and criteria for selection were quite secretive. In fact, the'board members 
who were not on the search committee did not know that Fisher was under consideration until the 
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day before he was selected (lJ\'aIl Street Jaurnnl, November 1, 1993). The choice of Fisher was 
surprise, not only to the board but also to Motorola (New York Times, October 28, 1993I a]). He had 
been a finalist, however, in the recent succession at IBM (also a Comprehensive Search), and he 
was well known to Roche. Although he had a technical and a not marketing background he was 
relatively young, was noted for good judgment of business and technology opportunities, and 
had turned Motorola around. Further, analysts thought he was a good choice to rejuvenate 
Kodak (New York Times, October 28, 1993[b]). They had feared that the board might select an 
executive who was too marketing-oriented instead of one with a strong vision of the changing 
technological marketplace. Fisher assumed CEO responsibilities on December 1st at which time 
Whitmore stepped down. 
This example shows a board of directors, and not the CEO, as primary decision-makers in the 
selection. The process of finding a successor took only a few months but involved an extensive 
effort, including hiring a search firm and actively considering many candidates. The result was the 
selection of a successor who would bring into the company skills to redirect it in meeting changing 
conditions. 
Concluding note 
Our main implication is that not all CEO successions are alike in the consequences they have for 
organizations and their members. There are predictable, systematic differences that have meaning 
and significance for how well organizations manage leadership transitions. HR executives, especially 
to the extent that they are knowledgeable about the politics and are involved in the candidate 
search, can support the move from one CEO to the next by attending to the different ways by 
which Crown Heirs, Horse Races, Coups d'Etat, and Comprehensive Searches affect people in 
organizations. 1ftJ' 
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"Two primary advantages ofinvesting in leadership 

development are increased perfonnallce 

(near- and long-term) and higher rates ofretention of 

. talented employees". 

In this interview. Steward D Friedman talks about 
fundamentals ofsuccession planning and hiJhliJhts 
the advantages of corporate leadership training. 
H' 	 What according to you is succession planning? 
I define succession systems as the rules and procedures 
that form the context for a typical succession event 
(i.e., a change in job incumbency), including executive 
development and placement practices. All 
organizations have succession systems; they are 
ubiquitous. All organizations face the challenges and 
opportunities inherent in the need to replace current 
leaders. 
H' 	 Why succession planning is an important issue at the 
strategic level of an organization? When is the right 
time to do succession planning? 
Because leaders matter, the development and selection 
of the next generation of leaders is a critical success 
factor for organizations. There is no right or wrong 
time to engage organizational resources in the 
management of succession systems. Rather, it is best 
if this activity is continual. 
m' 	 "Choosing a CEO is probably the most important 
decision a Board makes". What aspects should the board 
me~bers need to take before choosing a CEO? What 
is the board's role in CEO succession planning? 
Over the last two decades boards have become 
increasingly powerful and active in the management of 
succession systems. As we describe in our article on the 
succession process, organizations adopt different 
models and they have different consequences. If 
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commitment to the new leader by multiple stakeholders is important, then decision-makers 
should seek to include these stakeholders in the process of setting criteria and choosing 
candidates. 
w 	 Are criteria for choosing CEOs in family managed businesses different from that of 
professionally run companies? Discuss. 
Naturally it's different because the interests of the family owners must be served. The 
downside risk, of course, is that outsiders, including market participants, might not agree 
with the expressed interests of the family owners, particularly if the latter are not active in 
the business but are only interested in returns on their capital. 
iii" 	 Why succession planning fails? 
Succession planning can fail for a number of reasons. The most common is the failure to 
accurately assess the fit between person and position. 
CE 	 Why is the leadership training so important? 
Leadership training is important because we are experiencing a painful lack of leadership, 
and it shows. Further, we now know that leadership capacity can be increased if systematic 
attention is paid to doing so. 
... 	 What according to you are the strategic advantages of leadership development in an 
organization? 

Two primary advantages of investing in leadership development are increased performance 

(near- and long-term) and higher rates of retention of talented employees. 

~. 	 You have been recognized worldwide as one of the eminent thought leaders in the field of 
Leadership. Your work has been appeared in reputed media such as the 
New Yark Times, The Wall StreetJournal and The Businessweek. To what factors you attribute 
to your success? 
Working with smart, committed people and, learning as much as possible from them. i. 
The interview was conducted by RIl.jesh Kumar Singh, Consulting Editor, Global CEO, ICFAI Press. 
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